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A MANIFESTO ON UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
by Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Franco Modigliani, Beniamino Moro, Dennis J. 
Snower, and Robert Solow 
Foreword 
This manifesto challenges a pernicious orthodoxy that has gripped Europe's 
policy makers. It is that d emand- and supply-side policies must have different aims, 
that a limited number of supply-side policies are to be devoted to fighting 
unemployment, and that demand management (and particularly monetary policy) is 
are to be devoted solely to fighting inflation. The prevailing orthodoxy also claims 
that the choice of policy instruments for combating unemployment is a political 
decision, in which each instrument is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
In what follows, we outline various practical proposals aimed at a prompt 
reduction of unemployment. We are confident that if the advice is given proper 
attention by governments and monetary authorities, unemployment can be reduced 
significantly in a matter of a few years.  
We will divide the proposed actions into t hose bearing on the revival of 
aggregate demand (demand policies) and those addressed to the reform of the labour 
and product markets and the system of benefits for the unemployed (supply policies).  
But we stress from the very beginning that we regard our proposals as strictly 
complementary with one another. Each proposal, applied in isolation, may produce 
little or even perverse effects, while the simultaneous application can be counted upon 
to yield the desired outcome. This holds in particular with respect to the relation 
between demand and supply policies. The underlying idea is that it is much easier to 
encourage people to look for jobs if there are jobs to be found and it is much easier to 




1. The Unemployment Problem 
 
We share the view that at present time unemployment is the most serious and 
urgent problem facing the European Union (EU). In 1997, the average rate of 
unemployment in these countries was 11%, (19 million) with peak s of 15-20%, while 
in the 60's and early 70's it was almost universally well below 3% and nowhere over 
5%. Such a huge rate of unemployment results in an immense waste of resources, 
through loss of output, that can be estimated at some 15% or more, and even larger 
loss of saving-investment potential. It is degrading and demeaning for the 
unemployed and with damaging long run consequences, especially for the young that 
represent, in most countries, the bulk of the unemployment. And it is a source of 
dangerous social tensions, as has been shown by the recent German elections.    
We also share the view that the measures that have been proposed in 
numerous meetings of representatives of member governments at various levels, 
including the Amsterdam (June ’97) and  Luxembourg (November ’97) meetings 
especially devoted to this problem, suggest that many of European leaders have not 
adequately confronted the nature of the problem. Consequently they have not 
succeeded in agreeing on politically feasible programs that have a chance of 
producing an appreciable decline in the current, high unemployment rate in the 
relevant near future.  
 
2. False and Misleading Explanations for European 
Unemployment 
 
The widespread acceptance of the timid program agreed so far seems to reflect 
in part the view, by now common in Europe, that unemployment is a calamity due to 
causes beyond the capacity of governments to manage, except possibly, by increasing 
profits and generally increasing income inequalities.  And this conclusion has led to a 
convergence of both the right and the left on the view that the scourge must be 
bravely endured for fear that any remedy might make matters worse. 
Many possible causes have been advanced to account for the high and 
persistent rate of unemployment in the EU. They vary somewhat along the political 
spectrum. On the right, it has been argued that EU unemployment is primarily the 
outcome of (i) the absence of the needed skills (there are jobs but the unemployed are 
not qualified to fill them), (ii) the large s hare of long-term unemployed who lack 
motivation to seek jobs, and (iii) the crushing burden of taxes. All these arguments 
contain grains of truth, but it easy to be misled by them. 
The first argument is supported by the observation that the rise in 
unemployment has fallen disproportionately on the less skilled and qualified segments 
of the labour force. But American experience over the past few decades suggests that 
when unskilled workers are not consigned to an "unemployment trap" through 
misguided welfare entitlements, then the demand for unskilled labour fluctuates with  
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the availability of jobs. When available jobs shrink, workers with higher 
qualifications displace those less qualified, and when demand and job opportunities 
improve, the unemployment rat e of the less qualified declines. 
The share of long-term unemployment varies substantially among EU member 
states; but there is good reason to believe that a large  share of long term unemployed. 
is more the effect than the cause of a high and persisting  unemployment.  
As for taxes, it is estimated that in 1997, total government levies amounted to 
about 43% of GDP in the EU versus 31.6% in the US.  But these figures fail to 
distinguish between taxes that pay for government services and Social Security levies, 
that represent contributions toward pension benefits - i.e. saving - even if compulsory.  
If one leaves out Social Security contributions, the tax burden (direct plus indirect 
taxes) drops to 27% in Europe, versus some 23% in the US. The difference in  the 
untaxed share of income - 73% in Europe versus 77% in US  - is by no means 
dramatic and certainly cannot account for the fact that European unemployment is 8% 
higher than before the early 70's, while that of the US is no higher. If unemployment 
were so sensitive to small differences in taxation, why is it that Germany - with a tax 
burden hardly higher than that of the US (23.3%) - has unemployment similar to the 
rest of the European countries (9.1%), while the UK - with a tax burden 6 percentage 
points larger than Germany (29.5%) - has much smaller unemployment?   
It is of course true that in Europe Social Security levies take a much larger bite 
from income (16% of GDP versus 9% in US).  And of course the average rate of 
contribution for those workers actually covered by Social Security is much higher 
than 16%, reaching well over 40% for countries like Italy (44.3%) and France (46.8), 
where the replacement rate is very high. These high levies, it is said, increase 
unemployment both by sapping the incentive to work and by raising the cost of labour 
to employers. But these assertions are fundamentally flawed. Firstly, the higher 
European levies do not, as is generally supposed, reflect the need to cover the higher 
costs of a more wasteful and intrusive government. They are instead the result of an 
explicit social choice of saving (in compulsory form) a larger portion of income in the 
working years to receive a larger pension in retirement (and to retire earlier). 
Secondly, social security levies generally have little influence on real labour costs in 
the long run because they are born primarily by labour, and not by profit earners, 
whether they are formally collected from the employee nominal compensation or 
from the employer . ( Social security levies may be directly deducted from the take 
home pay. But even if they are not, say, because they are levied on the employer, they 
will be tend to be added to nominal labor cost and  passed on into higher price – much 
like an ad valorem tax – thereby reducing the real take home pay by the extent of the 
levy, at least to a first approximation.) A possible exception may arise for workers on  
a minimum wage, if that wage is fixed in terms of real take home pay. In that case 
higher social security levies cannot be shifted to the worker and will instead result in a 
higher real cost and price and thus higher unemployment. As for the assertion that 
high social security levies reduce the incentive to find a job by reducing the difference 
between unemployment compensation and take home pay, the conclusion is obviously 
valid only if the government pays the social insurance contributions of unemployed 
workers, or if pensions are independent of the workers’ contributions, which are  
certainly not the general practice. 
On the left side of the political spectrum, European unemployment has been 
portrayed as the outcome of iv) a crisis of capitalism, v) an excessively rapid rate of 
technological progress, and vi) competition with low -wage countries. All of these 
explanations are called into question by a very simple consideration: if they were  
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valid, they should produce the same high rate of unemployment in all other developed 
countries. But in fact the sharp rise in unemployment since the 80's has no parallel 
among other advanced industrial countries. In fact, the unemployment rate of every 
OECD country nowadays is below the EU average and only two such countries have 
unemployment rates that are even close. 
One further and very different line of thought that has supported tolerance 
toward  the status quo is the argument that the demand  - and supply  - side factors 
above are an inevitable part of European political and social policy and reforms would 
be intrinsically undesirable. The restrictive demand-side policies are commonly 
viewed as necessary prelude for the further economic and political integration of 
Europe; and the restrictive supply-side measures are frequently seen as required to 
retain economic equality and social cohesion. It is held that governments must choose 
between two disagreeable options: a “flexible” labour market bedeviled by wide 
income disparities and an “inflexible” labour market crippled by unemployment. The 
“flexible” market, where people's wages reflect their productivity, is allegedly 
achieved by reducing job security, restricting unemployment benefits and welfare 
entitlements, eliminating minimum wages, bashing the unions, and opting out of the 
social chapter. The “inflexible” market, where people's earnings reflect politicians' 
judgements about fairness and social cohesion, is supposedly achieved by the opposite 
policies. This generates the conviction that the ultimate choice, then, is between 
inequality and unemployment.  In this light, the high level of European 
unemployment is sometimes portrayed as a price that  must be paid for the 
achievement of other important long-term objectives.  
These presumptions are reflected in much of the European Union's policy 
approach to unemployment. The Luxembourg communiqué and those issued on 
earlier occasions restrict their purview to a very limited timid set of supply-side 
policies and do not even mention the possible role of demand management policy, and 
monetary policy in particular, in affecting unemployment. Furthermore, they stress 
that unemployment is a problem that can and must be solved within each country, 
without explicit co-ordination of policies between EU countries even though, in 
joining the EURO system, the member countries renounce the possibility of 
independent demand management policy, monetary or fiscal, and come into close 
competition on supply-side policies. 
By contrast, we believe that the bulk of European unemployment serves no 
useful purpose whatsoever. On the contrary, it is overtly harmful to the achievement 
of the objectives that have been used to rationalize the problem. Since work is the 
major avenue whereby people are able to claw their way out of poverty and overcome 
economic disadvantage, high levels of unemployment  - particularly long-term 
unemployment - are deleterious to social cohesion and economic integration.  
We call for rejecting the powerful pernicious myth, that blinds policy makers 
to unemployment policies that could reduce unemployment without widening the gap 
between the rich and poor. Thus it is important to expose the myth and get on with the 
urgent business of fundamental policy reform. The trick is to recognise that much of 
the current employment policy is responsible for the disagreeable choice between 
unemployment and inequality. The current system of unemployment benefits and 
taxes is a good example. When unemployed people find jobs, their unemployment 
benefits are removed and taxes are imposed. Not surprisingly, this policy discourages 
the unemployed from seeking work. Within this misguided system, a policy of 
restricting the benefits will reduce unemployment but create more inequality. What 
usually gets overlooked is that this unemployment-inequality trade-off is largely the  
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outcome of the tax -benefit system. If we changed the system, we could free ourselves 
of the disagreeable trade-off. 
 For example, generous unemployment benefits  - along with the taxes to 
finance them - help sustain the jobless, but only at the cost of diminishing employers' 
incentives to create jobs and employees' incentives to accept them. 
It is thus extremely important to differentiate carefully between the genuinely 
promising policy proposals and those that are unpromising in the sense that they may 
reasonably be expected to turn out ineffective or counter-productive. Making this 
distinction is not easy because many of the policies that influence unemployment are 
highly complimentary with one another. This means that potentially enlightened 
policy initiatives are often ineffective when implemented in isolation from one 
another. Employment-promoting supply-side p olicies frequently enhance the 
effectiveness of employment-promoting demand-side policies, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, counter-productive policies often emasculate the influence of 
enlightened policy measures. In the domain of unemployment policy, bad measures 
drive out the good, and good measures reinforce one another.  
In the next section we review several of the major “conventional” policies 
which have been implemented or proposed and show that they belong to the 
“unpromising” set and are, in the end, a n important source of European 
unemployment.  
3. Misguided Policies as a Cause of High Unemployment   
We hold the view that the European unemployment is, in important part, the 
result of policy errors. These errors involve both a mismanagement of aggregate 
demand (demand policies) and an unimaginative approach to the supply side of the 
economy. We are confident that these errors can be corrected promptly, putting an 
end to the unremitting longer-run growth of European unemployment. 
 
3.1 Errors in Demand Management 
The words aggregate demand policy have become familiar to economists ever 
since Keynes used it to provide an understanding of the Great Depression and the role 
played in that episode by central banks. Yet at present the concept has become taboo 
among many European central bankers and political leaders, even though there is 
plenty of evidence that, in recent years, it plays a significant role in accounting for the 
rising [changes in] unemployment.  
A first suggestive piece of evidence is provided by  the observation made 
earlier that double digit unemployment is common only in Europe  - or more 
specifically among the countries that are in (or are candidates for) the EURO. In fact, 
the European countries not in the EURO have substantially lower unemployment 
rates: in Norway the rate is 4%, in Switzerland 5.5%, and in the UK 5.8%. 
This observation has some powerful implications.  It suggests that in order to 
gain insight into the constellation of causes responsible for EU unemployment, it is 
important to i dentify factors that are shared by most EU member states but are not in 
evidence in non-EURO countries.  
On the demand side one experience that the EURO countries have shared in 
common in the last few years and, generally not shared with others, has been the very 
restrictive aggregate demand policies, both fiscal and monetary. They have been  
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forced to pursue these policies as a result of their common endeavour to join the 
EURO. The common fiscal policy was the result of the Maastricht parameters and it 
was very restrictive in the light of the huge unemployment and resulting depressed 
government revenues, and of the tight monetary policy. One by-product of this policy 
has been the slow down of public sector infrastructure that is complementary with 
private sector investment. Similarly, monetary policy was made uniform by the fact 
that exchange rates were to be kept narrowly fixed while all restrictions on the free 
movement of capital were eliminated. Under these conditions, interest rates had to be 
the same fo r all the candidate countries and there was no room for the national banks 
to pursue an independent monetary policy. And the common monetary policy appears 
to have been also much too tight, especially in the light of the tightening of fiscal 
policy, resulting in a long period of excessively high real interest rates that have 
discouraged investment and swollen unemployment. 
The relation between unemployment and the demand for labour provides 
further evidence.  Since the beginning of the oil crisis, in 1973, the rate of growth of 
demand has fallen considerably below that of capacity output  -- the sum of 
productivity and labour force growth. In fact the growth of demand has been roughly 
the same as that of productivity. Thus demand could be satisfied without a significant 
increase in jobs and the growth in the labour force of around 2% went to swell the 
ranks of the unemployed. This process of jobs falling relatively to the labour force is 
confirmed by direct information on the available jobs, the sum of employment and 
vacancies. In most EU countries, the number of jobs offered in each year as a 
percentage of the country's labour force has tended to fall.  
For example in France in 1973 there were 101 jobs offered  for every 100 
persons in the labour force, but by 1993 the jobs available had shrunk to 89. As one 
would expect, unemployment moved inversely to job availability: as jobs kept 
shrinking well below the people seeking them, vacancies dwindled from 4% of the 
labour force in 1973 to a mere 1% in 1986; search time for an unemployed person 
grew longer and thus unemployment rose from 2.7 to 11.6%. There was only a short 
span of years, between 1986 and 1990, when demand rose temporarily somewhat 
faster than productivity, jobs increased from 90.7 to 92.7, and unemployment 
promptly fell from 10.9 to 8.1%. A similar story may be told of other EU member 
states. 
We believe that one reason for the drastic European decline in the demand for 
labour relative to its available supply - and the resulting rise in unemployment - has 
been a decline in investment relative to full-capacity output. In this connection it is 
interesting to observe that the difference between the growth of unemployment since 
the early 70’s in Europe (8.5%) versus the US (0%) occurs mostly in two episodes 
since 1982. Up to that year joblessness had increased sharply on both continents as 
consequence of a restrictive monetary policy and resulting fall in investment, which 
was unavoidable to halt an inflationary spiral, ignited by the two oil crises.  But after 
1982 the shortfall and unemployment continued to rise in Europe till 1986, whereas in 
the US, both fell promptly and significantly. The second episode begins in 1992 and 
extends to the present. In both these episodes, the investment rose relative to  full 
capacity in the US but remained stagnant at peak levels in Europe. 
3.2 Misguided Supply Policies 
The measures to combat unemployment that have been suggested do not, in 
our opinion, reflect the best options available from the potential portfolio of feasible  
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policy choices. One important source of the European unemployment problem are the 
misguided conventional policies that have been put into place to support the 
unemployed and protect the employed from job loss. The following provide three 
important examples. 
 
Minimum Wage Legislation 
 
Minimum wages are widespread in Europe and are potentially an important 
source of unemployment by excluding from work persons whose contributions to 
output is less than the minimum wage or by raising the real cost of production and 
hence reducing the demand for domestic output. To decree that a worker cannot 
accept a job for less than X is a misguided wrong approach since it will leave 
unemployed anyone who can contribute less than X to production. Despite numerous 
studies attempting to measure the influence of minimum wage legislation on 
unemployment, to date there is little consensus even about the direction of the 
influence. It is safe to say, however, that the implementation of minimum real wage 
legislation is unable t o play a major role in reducing European unemployment. 
Although empirical studies have shown that relatively modest increases in the 
minimum wage may not raise unemployment, there is widespread agreement that 
large minimum wage hikes - wage increases sufficient to eliminate the major income 
inequalities between mainstream employees and workers marginally attached to the 
labour market  - would have such an effect. To deny this would be tantamount of 
maintaining that labour demand is unaffected by any changes in real labour costs. (In 
fact, if substantial rises in the minimum wage led to increases in labour supply, then 
labour demand would have to rise in order for unemployment to remain unchanged.) 
One further negative impact of minimum wages comes from their interaction 
with high social security levees.  In so far as the minimum wage aims at assuring a 
minimum real take home pay, higher levies cannot be shifted to the employee: an 
increase in compulsory saving will be borne by the employer and raise the cost of  the 
employee. This is one of the important factors that make a minimum wage so high in 
Europe, discouraging the employment of less skilled labour. 
 
Job Security Legislation 
 
Some commentators have maintained that job security legislation helps reduce 
unemployment. The underlying argument is that such legislation reduces both firing 
(by making it more costly for employers to dismiss their employees) and hiring (by 
discouraging employers from taking on new recruits who may have to be dismissed in 
the future). But at given real wages, the firing costs generated by job security 
legislation discourage firing more than they discourage hiring, since firms that fire 
must pay the firing costs now, whereas firms that hire may have to pay the firing costs 
at some point in the future.  
However, this argument rests on tenuous foundations. In the first place, even 
though firms may initially find it economical to employ more people than would be 
optimal in the absence of constraint, they eventually will find it advantageous to 
shrink their labour force, at least through attrition and aging and also rely more on 
overtime. Second, and far more serious, the slow down in the flow of hiring greatly  
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reduces the chance of outsiders and particularly young people to find a job and is a 
major cause for the high, in some cases almost unbelievably high, incidence of 
unemployment among young people. This high rate is particularly striking in 
countries where no unemployment benefits are provided for people that have never 
held a job.  In addition, a rise in firing costs cannot be expected to leave real wages 
unchanged. On the contrary, the greater the firing costs, the greater will be the market 
power of the incumbent employees (insiders) and thus the higher the wages these 
workers can achieve. Taking further into account the fact that the high cost of firing 
will add to labour costs both directly and through redundancy, we can expect a lower 
demand for labour, at least in an open economy. On the whole, job security legislation 
must be regarded a major negative influence on unemployment especially youth 
unemployment, even if it might have desirable effects in other directions.  
Consequently, the lower will be the demand for labour. For these various reasons, 
increasing job security is far more likely to eventually decrease jobs and employment 
rather than the reverse. 
 
Worksharing and Early Retirement 
 
There can be no objection to people reducing their work week or retiring early 
if they are prepared to accept the corresponding reduction in weekly pay, but we hold 
that there is no justification for the government to provide incentives for people to 
work shorter hours or retire earlier. 
The logic underlying work-sharing and early retirement is of course 
elementary. If there is a fixed amount of paid work to be done in the economy, and if 
this work falls very unequally across the population - with a majority of people 
enjoying full-time employment while a minority is saddled with long periods of 
unemployment - then considerations of equity and social cohesion make it reasonable 
to seek policies that share the burden of unemployment more democratically. In short, 
if the pain and impoverishment of unemployment are inevitable, it may the best to 
spread the misery as evenly as possible. 
The problem with this approach is that the underlying premise is false. We do 
not believe that the European unemployment problem is unavoidable. The amount of 
work to be done in the economy is not fixed. When the economy is in recession, an 
increase in production and employment - in response, for instance, to a rise in export 
demand or on private investment - will lead to a rise in purchasing power and thereby 
generate a further increase in production and employment. In this sense, 
unemployment is not inevitable. Policy makers who see it as such are being unduly 
defeatist; they should spend more thought on bringing unemployment down rather 
than on spreading it more thinly. 
We therefore agree that those measures are not appropriate as the central pillar 
of a policy strategy to reduce unemployment. In fact, they pose some dangers of 
becoming counter-productive in the sense they might reduce the total number of hours 
worked in the economy even if they succeeded in increasing the number or people 
working.  It has proved very  difficult to implement them without raising non-wage 
labour costs (particularly costs of hiring and training) and thereby discouraging firms 
from creating more jobs. Furthermore, by diminishing the number of people 
competing for jobs, these measures may indirectly put upward pressure on wages and 
thereby on prices. Governments or monetary authorities may then feel called upon to  
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dampen inflation through contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, thereby 
generating further unemployment. 
The push for shorter work week as a device to reduce unemployment by work 
sharing has taken recently a dangerous turn when some of its sponsors, in an effort to 
gain popular support for the measure, have proposed that the reduction from 40 to 35 
hours should be accompanied b y an unchanged weekly pay.  We regard this version 
as little more than demagogy. It would compound the difficulties already encountered 
in reducing individual hours while maintaining the hours worked by the firm, by 
imposing a rise in hourly wages by 5/35 or nearly 15 %. The effect could not but be 
disruptive. The increase in labour costs could hardly be expected to come out of 
profits but could be expected, instead, to be passed along in higher output prices. This 
would result in a weekly real wage equival ent to 35 hours and /or in successful 
demands for higher nominal wages, initiating a wage-price spiral.  But with fixed 
exchanges or a single currency, the rising prices would also reduce the share of the 
country's foreign and domestic markets and prove a  new source of unemployment. 
This effect might be mitigated if all countries undertook the measure simultaneously, 
but the inflationary spiral would be reinforced. 
4. Proposed Policies for a Timely Reduction of Unemployment 
In what follows, we set forth a n umber of practical proposals aimed at a 
prompt reduction of unemployment. We are quite confident that if the advice is given 
proper attention by governments and monetary authorities, unemployment can be 
reduced by 4 or 5 percentage points in a matter of a  few years and without 
compromising the recent gain in subduing inflation. 
Our proposals cover both demand- and supply-side policies. We wish to 
emphasize that these policies are  not  to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Our 
recommended policy package is  not to be viewed as a portfolio of independent 
measures, from which policy makers can pick and choose. Rather, as noted at the 
beginning of the Manifesto, we regard the policies as complementary to one another, 
with the demand-side policies creating a need for the new jobs that the supply-side 
policies make available. 
The failure to exploit policy complementarities may be an important reason 
why so many of the partial, piecemeal labour market reforms implemented in EU 
member states have done little to reduce Europe's unemployment problem. In Spain, 
for example, a labour market reform has been introduced in 1984, whose main aim 
was to achieve a greater flexibility in labour contracts. Among other things, this 
reform introduced fixed-term labour contracts with low firing costs. As a result, fixed-
term labour contracts have grown quickly and Spanish firms have used them to buffer 
fluctuations in demand by changing the number of fixed-term employees. But, at the 
same time, this policy reduced the risk of unemployment for workers with permanent 
contracts, which reinforced the bargaining strength of the insiders. Since wage 
bargaining agreements mainly reflect the interests of the latter, this reform has turned 
out to cause more rigidity rather than more flexibility of the wage rate. To mitigate 
this unwanted effect, Spain has recently reintroduced some restrictions on fixed term 
contracts and has reduced firing costs for all workers. 
In France, several acts have been passed aimed at introducing a greater 
flexibility in the labour market and at preventing the negative effects of both 
minimum wages and the highest payroll taxes among OECD countries. Moreover, 
restrictions on part-time work have been eased, and work -sharing has been  
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encouraged. But nothing has been done in this country to reduce the stringency of job 
protection legislation and the bargaining power of insiders.  
In Italy, a reform of the labour market was first passed in 1991, which allowed 
small and medium size firms to dismiss redundant workers, but only with the 
agreement of the unions. The so-called "mobilità lunga” (long mobility) was also 
introduced, which consists in the possibility to put the unwanted workers in the social 
security system (thus aggravating its operating costs) before giving these workers the 
right to definitely retire. A second reform has been recently introduced in 1997, which  
permits  firms to hire workers temporarily from appropriate employment agencies      
(But in a typical display of Italian partisan economic obtuseness, it has been suggested 
that the people to be rented out on a part time basis, should be hired by the agency on 
a permanent basis!). 
Also in Sweden, some reforms have been approved in order to increase labour 
market flexibility. In this country, unemployment ben efits are of comparatively short 
duration, but the replacement ratios (the ratios of unemployment benefits to wages) 
are high. Thus, jobless people can move from unemployment benefits to training 
programs and back, while generous welfare state entitlements encourage leisure 
relative to employment. In general, the welfare benefits in this country are so 
generous to render the condition of inactivity, especially for medium aged people, 
more appealing than employment. 
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are the only two European countries 
that have witnessed appreciable reductions in unemployment from their labour market 
reforms over the last two decades. These successes may well be due to the broad-
based nature of their reforms, enabling them to exploit significant policy 
complementarities. The UK, for instance, introduced legislation restricting strikes and 
secondary picketing, decentralising wage bargaining, liberalising hiring and firing 
restrictions, reducing the duration of unemployment benefits and tightening the 
associated eligibility criteria. Moreover, minimum wages have been abolished (soon 
to be reintroduced by the current Labour government) and unemployment benefits 
have been reduced, and, at the same time, new procedures have been implemented in 
order to facilitate the search for a job for the unemployed people. These reforms, 
together with the decision to opt out from the European Monetary Union, at least in 
the initial stage, have spared this country the need to adopt restrictive aggregate 
demand policies and have greatly contributed to the fall in the UK unemployment rate 
from 10.5% in the 1993 (approximately equal to the EU average) to less than 6% in 
1997. This result, moreover, has been achieved without substantially changing other 
welfare state entitlements, such as housing benefits, or by a thoroughgoing drive to 
improve education and training systems. 
The experience of the UK and the Netherlands also highlights the dangers of 
leaving particular policy complementarities unexploited. In both  countries the 
tightening of the unemployment benefit system was not matched by a correspondingly 
fundamental reform of the sickness and incapacity benefit systems. Consequently 
budgetary pressures have shifted from unemployment benefits to sickness and 
incapacity benefits. Since the latter have a longer duration than unemployment 
benefits, the shift created more serious conditions of dependency from publicly 
provided income support than unemployment insurance. Thus in the Netherlands, 
which has one of the m ost generous disability benefits systems among the OECD 
countries, the percentage of persons directly involved in social benefits reaches 17%. 
In sum, European countries have not, on the whole, sought to reduce 
unemployment by implementing a coherent strat egy of fundamental reforms across a  
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broad range of complementary policies. In the main, these countries have adopted a 
number of ad hoc measures that attempt marginal corrections to the most egregious 
distortions stemming from existing labour market policies or regulations. We argue 
that, since only marginal, piece meal changes have been implemented, existing 
restrictive institutions and regulations that are complementary to each other continue 
to interact, blocking the effectiveness of the recent reforms a nd prolonging 
unemployment. 
Accordingly, our recommended policy strategy is a) to implement a broad 
spectrum of supply-side policy reforms that give employers a greater incentive to 
create jobs in response increases in demand and give employees a greater incentive to 
accept these jobs, and (b) to implement demand-side policies that enable the European 
economies to raise their growth rates of capital formation and productivity, and to use 
the productive potential that has been released through the supply-side reforms. 
 
4.1 Aggregate Demand Policies  
 
We believe that the demand-side strategy for reducing EU unemployment 
should involve policies that stimulate a broad revival of investment activity, taking 
care not to ignite inflationary pressures or increase the size of the national debt 
relative to national assets. The process of stimulating investment is, to a very 
considerable extent, self reinforcing, because of a well established mechanism, known 
as the accelerator effect. As investment rises, increasing employment and output, the 
initially existing excess productive capacity will become more fully utilised and there 
will soon be a need for additional capacity, which will require new investment. 
It is generally agreed that labour and capital are often complementary in the 
production process, so that an increase in the capital stock usually leads to a rise in 
labour productivity. Provided that the economy is kept out of recession - so that the 
danger is avoided that firms employ as little labour as possible to meet a given, 
deficient product demand - and provided that there are sufficient supply incentives in 
place to encourage employers and potential employees to exploit profitable job 
opportunities, increases in labour productivity will generally lead to increases in 
labour demand and consequent reductions in unemployment. 
The endeavour to expand the rate of investment need not, and should not, be 
limited to private investment. The constraints on public investment are currently felt 
with particular stringency  because of the large public-sector debt existing in many 
European countries, and because of the consequent limitations on fiscal deficit 
imposed by the Maastricht parameters, together with the unfortunate circumstance 
that, in computing the deficit, all expenditures, whether on current account or for 
investment, are treated identically. Under these conditions, governments have 
frequently found it expedient to cut investments, even if highly desirable, rather than 
cut the budget for public employment  (e.g., by reducing the number of employees). 
Given the prospective difficulties many EU member states face in satisfying the 
Maastricht criteria, this under-investment is likely to continue. 
In order for an expansion of public investment to produce the same beneficial 
effects on unemployment as private investment, it is necessary that it should be 
financed neither by cutting other expenditure - except for transfer payments whenever 
it is possible - nor by raising taxes (which at present would be practically impossible  
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anyway). This means that the additional investments must be financed, for most of the 
countries, in just the same way as private investments are typically financed, namely 
by raising the money in the capital markets in the form of debt or equity. Private-
sector finance of public investment, along the lines currently being explored in some 
EU countries such as the UK, needs to be expanded as well. 
In this context, it would be important redefine the to introduce a distinction, 
long overdue, between the current and the capital account deficit, and to redefine the 
budget deficit, for the purpose of the Maastricht agreement and the later stability pact, 
as consisting of the current account deficit only. The Current Account Budget should 
include all current expenditures and receipts (expenditures that benefit those present 
and receipts collected from them) and it is appropriate to require that this budget be 
balanced, as this places the cost of current expenditure on the current beneficiaries.  
The amount of  public capital expenditures, on the other hand, should be 
primarily limited by the requirement that each project should have a return over its 
life at least as competitive as market returns (with proper adjustment for taxes). 
However the difference, if any, between the cash receipts and the annual cost of 
providing the services, including the interest cost, and the depreciation, would be 
charged to the Current Account as a current expense (if negative) or treated as a 
current income (if positive). 
Of course deficit financing of government expenditure, when there is no room 
for an expansion of employment, tends to crowd out private investment, and thus 
burden future generations by depriving them of the return on crowded out capital. But 
we hold that the program of government investment we advocate will not harm and 
may even improve the lot of future generations. In the first place, when there is an 
enormous reserve of unemployed resources, investment will increase income and thus 
saving, at least to the extent of financing the investment without any crowding out. In 
the second place, infrastructural investment increases the marginal product of both 
capital and labour in the private sector, which will have expansionary effects. Finally, 
we agree that debt financing of capital expenditures satisfying the above criteria, 
unlike that financing a current account deficit, would not be harmful to future 
generations, even if it displaced an equal amount of private investment, because its 
return would at least compensate for the return lost on private investment. 
We propose to concentrate public investment on specific infrastructures 
capable of giving returns in the short run. To finance these investments we propose 
that the existing European Structural Funds should be more used than in the past. 
Such funds, already considerable (153 billions of ECU's for the period 1994-'99), 
should be enlarged and their regulations should be re-negotiated, especially with 
regard to the procedure to spend them, since in the future they could become the main 
financial instrument of the European strategy to cure unemployment and promote 
growth. Today these funds can be spent only if the State using them provides 
simultaneously an equal amount of funds. This regulation is wise, but an interval 
should be granted when there is a proper guarantee. Moreover, to avoid delays, a 
particular care should be devoted to the organisation of the structures in charge of the 
projects. In countries like Italy, in which it is particularly important to keep at a low 
level the public deficit, recently achieved after a long and costly effort, it would be 
advisable to partly finance the infrastructural investments by also using a share of the 
receipts obtained from the privatisation of public enterprises. 
But, the success of the operation requires a revision of the principle that has 
emerged from the meetings in Amsterdam and Luxembourg, namely that the solution 
of the unemployment problem is not a collective responsibility but a task to be tackled  
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by each country o n its own. This approach is mistaken and will make a prompt 
solution very unlike. It springs from the view that unemployment is mainly due only 
to the malfunctioning of the labour market. But while we all concur that labour 
relations greatly contribute to  the problem, we also share the view that demand plays 
a major role, relying on the evidence presented above as well as other evidence and 
reasoning. But the agreements of the two recent summits actually hamper the exercise 
of demand policy, because, after assigning to the individual states the task of reducing 
unemployment, they deprive them of all the classical tools of demand management: i) 
monetary policy, because individual central banks have already little control over 
interest rates and will have, gradually, even less; ii) fiscal policy, because of the rigid 
constraint on fiscal deficit; and iii) exchange rate policy. And the European Union, 
besides being exonerated of any responsibility, has no tools either: the Brussels 
Commission has no resources to spend, and the European Central Bank (ECB) is to 
concern itself exclusively with price stability.  
The solution we are advocating, by contrast, requires co -ordination of policies 
of EU member states. Indeed, if any country were to engage in a demand-side 
expansion alone, then, as is well-known, its effect on unemployment would be much 
smaller than under a co-ordinated policy approach, because much of its beneficial 
impact would be lost to it and would spill over to others, through higher imports. The 
resulting deterioration of the current account could be so severe as to make the 
expansion inadvisable. But when the expansion is simultaneous and symmetric, then 
the increased imports will be offset by an increase in exports resulting from the 
increased imports of the other countries, and this will both help the current account 
balance and restore the potency of the expansion of investment. In short, in a 
simultaneous expansion, countries would be helping each other. 
 
The role of the European Central Bank 
In addition to the supply side measures illustrated in Section 4.2 below, our 
proposed plan advocates a significant revival of aggregate demand and that revival in 
turn is expected to come from a strong and long lasting inversion of the persistently 
declining or stagnant trend of private investment activity. We expect that some of this 
inversion may come from the supply measures below; but most of it, especially in the 
early stages, must come from the long acknowledged, classical tool of investment 
control: monetary policy. But this policy is the prerogative of the Central Banks, 
which, hereafter, means essentially the new European Central Bank. 
This has one very basic implication: if Europe really intends to achieve a rapid 
reduction in unemployment, it is necessary to give a broader and more constructive 
interpretation to the statutes that define the role of the Central Bank than that which is 
currently widely accepted. According to that interpretation, the bank has but one 
target (one single front on which to do battle), namely preventing inflation. We urge a 
fundamental broadening of that interpretation – analogous to that of the U.S Federal 
Reserve - to include, on an equal footing, another target: keeping unemployment 
under control. And we are confident that  it can do so without renouncing or 
sacrificing its commitment against inflation.  
There are three major considerations that support this view of the proper role 
of the Central Bank on the path of return to high employment. In the first place, 
making price stability the overriding target at this time is much like using all your 
military budget to fight the last war, an enemy that is no longer there. Inflation has 
been a most serious problem because of, and during, the two oil crisis and their 
aftermath (including German reunification). But since 1991 inflation has been falling  
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steadily for the group as a whole, and within each country, with hardly any exception. 
It is now around 2%, clearly a small number especially when taking into account the 
unquestionable upward bias of all inflation indices.  
In summary, the perils of inflation as a result of a revival of investments are 
negligible at the present time. And that danger will be further reduced  by applying  
several of the supply measures advocated below, which will increase the incentives to 
accept jobs as they become available. We submit therefore that, under present 
conditions, assigning the ECB the single task of fighting inflation should not be 
acceptable. It leaves it far too much unnecessary leeway, e.g. given that wages are 
rigid, it can satisfy that target by a prudential policy of raising interest rates ad lib, 
reducing investment and raising unemployment further.  
A second reason why the ECB should not make price stability its single, 
overriding focus is that, realistically, it has very limited control over the price level, at 
least in the short run. Indeed, its policy instruments – the money supply or interest 
rate policy  – do not directly affect prices when there is slack in the labor market. 
Given large-scale unemployment, they can affect prices only indirectly by affecting 
the rate of economic activity, and hence the rate of unemployment (and utilization of 
capacity) and thereby the growth of wages and finally prices. But unemployment is 
not a very potent instrument to control inflation when there is already plenty of slack 
while it has a major impact on society’s welfare. 
The third and crucial reason for the central role of the ECB in the program of 
investment expansion is that, as control over monetary policy shifts from the states to 
the ECB, the latter becomes the only institution that has substantial power to influence 
investments. The other possible approach to stimulate investments could be through 
fiscal measures (subsidies, tax rebates, tax credits), but such measures cannot play a 
significant role at this time in view of the severe fiscal squeeze resulting from the 
Maastricht parameters.  
One can think of various objections to this reinterpretation of the role and 
responsibilities of the ECB. One is that the Bank lacks the power to stimulate 
investment. This objection is especially popular among Central Bankers. But this 
argument is disingenuous. How can a Central Bank claim that it can control prices if it 
cannot control demand and how can  it control demand if it has no control at all over 
investment? Another objection is that the Euro needs to establish itself as a 
prestigious, credible currency in the world capital markets. To satisfy this need what 
is required is a policy that will be viewed as continuation of the though policies of the 
Bundesbank, involving high interest rates that will attract capital and help to support 
high exchange rates, especially with respect to the dollar, seen as the major competing 
world currency. We believe that it would be a deadly mistake for the ECB to focus on 
a competitive struggle with the dollar, fought trough the escalation of interest rates, 
and at the expense of an economic revival. The high value of the dollar is the result of 
the strength of the American economy achieved through a policy of full employment 
pursued with “benign neglect” of the international “pecking order”. The ECB must 
adopt the same attitude of independence aiming at fostering  an economy as vigorous 
and  prosperous as the American economy.  
The awesome responsibility of the ECB for maintaining high growth in 
Europe have become even more serious with tragic events of the last few week in 
Asia, and Russia and the sharp set backs in the equity markets. It is up to the ECB and 
to Europe with its still sound fundamentals to engage in a policy of supporting 
domestic investment and demand  offsetting the expected decline in net exports.   
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4.2 Supply-Side Measures 
We do not believe that a widespread liberalisation of the labour market in 
Europe, along the lines of that existing in the American or Japanese labour markets, is 
advisable, even if it were feasible. It is important to keep in mind that the present 
European welfare systems spring from different cultures and from different ways to 
interpret the solidarity and equality principles. However, we think that, in order to 
fight unemployment, it is necessary and feasible to introduce a substantially higher 
degree of flexibility in the European labour and product markets including, where 
necessary, a relaxation of job security legislation, a reduction in the coverage of 
collective bargaining agreements, and a reduction of barriers to entry of firms and of 
barriers to geographic mobility of labour. We believe that if such measures are 
combined with the reform strategy outlined below, both the efficiency and equity of 
European labour markets can be improved. The economic instruments now available 
in many European countries to pursue these efficiency and equity goals are 
insufficient. The portfolio of policy instruments needs to be expanded, along the lines 
suggested hereafter. 
The labour market flexibility policies, unlike the macroeconomic 
management, cannot be uniformly adopted by all the European countries; on the 
contrary, they should be adapted to the different situations of each country and region. 
  We begin by recalling that an important aspect of European unemployment is 
found in the regional differences that characterize this phenomenon. We believe that 
one important source of differential unemployment within countries is the uniformity 
of wages imposed by unions or custom in national negotiations, disregarding the 
glaring fact of important regional differences in productivity.  We are in agreement 
that to remedy this problem  requires recognizing the need for  regional differentiation 
in labor cost per hour reflecting regional differences in productivity. But in order for 
these reforms to obtain a large social consensus, it is necessary that they be 
accompanied by measures that compensate for  their negative effects on income 
distribution. In fact, it is evident that fundamental labour market reforms are very 
difficult to implement because usually, while they have readily identifiable 
distributional consequences for specific groups of people, it is not always easy to 
readily see their advantages for everybody. For this reason, it is likely that the most 
radical components of the reform packages will probably face strong opposition from 
the groups most affected by such reforms. Compensating the prospective losers is 
important to mitigate this difficulty. With respect to the realignment of labor in line 
with productivity one basic approach is not to put all the emphasis on reducing wages 
but on reducing cost to the firm through appropriate subsidies. Some suggestions for 
accomplishing this task efficiently are suggested below (see e.g. the section on the 
BTP). 
There is also evidence that the lower productivity and higher unemployment in 
some regions, like the South of France Italy and Spain, reflects a paucity of 
entrepreneurs. We share the opinion that in these less developed regions, more active 
policies are needed in order to encourage new firms and help small and medium-size 
firms, whose growth can be accelerated by some appropriate measures. For example, 
Italy has had some success with industrial districts. By industrial districts we mean 
here some horizontal aggregations of small and medium size firms, where each firm 
operates in an autonomous way from the others, but whose production is in fact co-
ordinated with others in the district, with resulting external economies. 
A successful example of regional development pushed on by the diffusion of  
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industrial districts is the functional integration of small and medium size firms that 
occurred in many Italian regions like Toscana, Marche, Veneto, and Emilia Romagna. 
But, for the regional development to further proceed by the implementation of this 
model, we need to introduce some reforms of the industrial districts, so as to reinforce 
them and make them more effective and dynamic. Such measures should aim 
primarily at creating advisory institutions in the field of bureaucratic, fiscal, financial 
and technological matters. As for the new technologies, it is fitting to emphasize the 
importance of the re-organization and the expansion of institutions for labour training 
and of the relations between firms and Universities and other research institutions.  
Another characteristic common to many underdeveloped regions is the 
rationing and high cost of credit, which affects  new and small firms in general, 
reflecting both the cost of processing small loans, their risk, as well as the 
monopolistic power (and sometime the inefficiency) of the local banks. In these 
regions the spread between lending and borrowing rates has been huge and nearly 
prohibitive, discouraging small firms and new initiative. In some countries like Italy a 
great improvement in the availability and cost of loans has been obtained trough the 
formation of cooperative of borrowers. The members of the cooperative, in exchange 
for the availability and lower cost of credit, must be willing to assume some personal 
responsibility to guarantee the repayment of the overall obligation assumed by the 
cooperative, something they are willing to do because of  personal knowledge and 
trust of those who are admitted to the cooperative. In addition local governments 
(regional or subregional) typically have provided a rotating fund which also serves to 
increase the  guarantee offered to the banks.   
We advocate, where necessary, a broad supply-side reform package that 
includes the following well-known elements: 
 
•  Job creation policies and product market reform  to reduce barriers to 
employment creation. 
Examples of such policies include tax reform or relaxation of regulations 
restricting the entry of firms, restrictions on land use, regulations limited product 
market competition, as well as measures to avoid penalizing flexible time 
schedules and part-time work. Measures to encourage part-time leasing of workers 
may help not only to provide currently unemployed workers with a stepping stone 
into the world of work, but also help firms restructure their organization of 
production and work in accordance with the new advances in information 
technology and flexible manufacturing. 
The tight regulation of the atypical working contracts now existing in 
many European countries deserves special attention in formulating labour market 
reforms. The abolition of the minimum wages regulations, at least in some works, 
and an extension and generalization of part-time jobs could favour youngsters and 
women, whose possibility to work is often tied to these more flexible kinds of 
contracts. Usually, on the contrary, the existing laws favour only long term labour 
contracts, which are much less flexible.  
•  Reform of job security legislation policies to reduce the ratio of firing costs of 
average wages:  
We have criticised earlier the policies that have pushed  job protection, to the 
point where firing of workers was a nearly impossible task. Although the situation 
has generally improved, there seems little question that the present institutions in 
many European countries still contribute to the unemployment problem by 
discouraging firms from hiring permanent employees even in the presence of a  
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rising demand. We therefore share the view that the reforms needed to reduce 
unemployment must include substantial reforms of the job security provisions.  
We do not believe that it would be possible or advisable to push reforms as far 
as the American system, where job security provisions are largely absent. But 
there must be a marked  liberalisation of the ability of  firms to eliminate surplus 
labour, and some with respect to dismissal of individual workers for cause. This is 
particularly important in order to deal with youth unemployment, which is a 
serious problem in many European countries. 
However we recommend that these reforms be postponed to a more suitable 
time. To carry them out now, when the demand is greatly depressed and there is 
plenty of unemployment, probably a good deal of redundant labour in many firms 
and few vacancies, would have simply the effect of condemning many workers to 
join the rank of the unemployed, initially reducing instead of increasing 
employment. It would therefore meet with  an understandably bitter opposition of 
union and workers who might well succeed in maintaining the status quo. In our 
view, therefore, the reforms should be postponed until, and made conditional 
upon, the realisation of more favourable labour market conditions, which should 
hopefully not take very long if our program is pursued. But it would seem feasible 
and desirable to spell out promptly the conditions for proceeding with the reforms, 
e.g. when unemployment first reaches 7%. Furthermore, the content of t hese 
reforms should be agreed upon promptly. This two stage approach should make 
the reforms far more palatable to labour while at the same time encouraging 
employers to assume more labour as the demand expands in the expectation that, 
if eventually the new employee assumed should prove redundant, they would be 
able to scale down their labour force. 
 
•  Search promoting policies to reduce labour market search costs, such as job 
counselling, information provision to unemployed workers and firms with 
vacancies.  The UK experience with its Restart Programme and its counselling 
initiatives associated with the Welfare to Work policy indicates that such search 
promoting policies have an important role to play in enhancing the effectiveness 
of other employment creation measures, such as employment vouchers and 
training initiatives. These latter measures are likely to have a strong influence only 
if the currently unemployed workers are aware of them and help to make use of 
them as part of explicitly formulated strategies of gaining long-term employment 
in accordance with their idiosyncratic abilities. 
•  policies to stimulate worker mobility, such as policies to increase the portability of 
housing subsidies, as well as the portability of health insurance and pensions 
between firms; and  
•  Unemployment benefit reforms:  
Unemployment benefit systems should be reformed in such a way as to give 
unemployed people appropriate incentives to seek work when jobs are available 
for them and to support them when such jobs are absent. Accordingly the size of 
unemployment benefits could be made to depend on the ratio of vacancies to 
unemployment. The greater the number of vacancies relative to unemployed (in 
specified skill categories), the lower the unemployment benefits would be (within 
these categories). This proposal would promote efficiency, since it would give the 
unemployed a greater incentive to search, the greater is the firms’ demand for 
their services. It would also help fulfil governments’ equity objectives, since 




  This policy would generate a favourable complementarity between demand-
side and supply-side policies. A government stimulus to aggregate demand (and 
thereby vacancies) could then be financed, partially or wholly, through the 
associated drop in unemployment benefit payments. 
  The political economy of unemployment benefit design could be influenced 
through the device of charging the cost of unemployment compensation to the 
public in the form of a separate tax. At present, the cost of unemployment, both its 
social cost and the cash cost of the benefit systems is not well known, because, as 
has been frequently noted, it typically affects but a small fraction of the 
population. This has the consequence that, on the one hand, the public does put 
enough pressure on the government and the Central Bank to correct the situation,  
and at the same time it makes voters frequently inclined to favour programs that 
grant excessive unemployment benefits through mechanisms that are 
economically wasteful. The above segregation would improve voters’ information 
on this issue and permit them to make better informed policy choices. 
 
Finally, we should like to stress that while the enforcement of specific micro-
supply policies is primarily a matter for the individual member governments, all 
the member states share a common interest in the design of the unemployment 
policies and in making sure that these policies are forcefully pursued everywhere   
This conclusion rests on the consideration  that, because of  the rising degree of 
factor mobility within the EU, as well as EU regulations concerning open market 
access and cross-border competition, the appropriate level of subsidiarity in 
unemployment policy making does n ot lie exclusively at the level of the EU 
member states. In addition, each member state has a very real and tangible interest 
in the reduction of unemployment in other countries as it contributes to reduce its 
own. Therefore the European Commission needs to take the lead in providing a 
legal and institutional framework within which necessary labour market reforms 
can take place and in making sure that the reforms are promptly carried through. 
 
In addition, we believe that EU governments should also consider some more 
innovative supply-side policy proposals that are designed to reform the incentives that 
employers and employees face. Currently EU governments spend massive sums of 
money on unemployment support, further education, and training. We believe that the 
question that should be asked is whether these funds could be redirected to create 
more incentives for employers to generate jobs and workers to become employed. The 
following are some illustrative policy measures that take this tack. 
Conditional Negative Income Taxes 
 
This measure may be seen as an alternative to supporting jobless people 
through unemployment benefits. The conditions attached to the proposed negative 
income tax would be analogous to those attached to current unemployment benefits. 
For instance if, under the current unemployment benefit system, people must provide 
evidence of serious job search in order to qualify for unemployment benefits, then 
they must also be required to provide such evidence under the proposed conditional 
negative income tax system; if unemployment benefits decline with unemployment 
duration under the current benefit system, then so too must the negative income taxes.   
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in US belongs to this family of  
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initiatives. The socially desirable relation between the magnitude of the negative 
income tax and the individual level of income has yet to be analysed rigorously. The 
EITC is hump-shaped (so that the magnitude of the negative income tax rises with 
income at low income levels and then  falls toward zero at higher income levels), 
whereas many of the proposed negative income tax schemes involve a strictly inverse 
relation between the size of the tax and the income level.  
The broad argument in favour of a switch from unemployment benefits to 
negative income taxes is that this policy could meet the equity and efficiency 
objectives of current unemployment benefit systems more effectively than the 
unemployment benefit systems themselves. Although conditional negative income 
taxes would generat e the same type of policy inefficiencies as unemployment 
benefits, the former would tend to do so to a lesser degree than the latter. For 
example, negative income taxes may be expected to discourage job search, but by less 
than unemployment benefits, for w hen a worker finds a job, he loses all his 
unemployment benefits, but only a fraction of his negative income taxes.  
It is worth noting that a major criticism of the traditional negative income tax 
schemes  - namely, that they make people's material well-being less dependent on 
employment and thereby discourage employment  - obviously doesn't apply to 
conditional negative income taxes, since these taxes are conditional on the same 
things as current unemployment benefits.  
Furthermore, conditional negative income taxes also tend to be more effective 
than unemployment benefits in overcoming labour market inefficiencies generated by 
credit constraints (e.g. people being unable to take enough time to find an appropriate 
job match or unable to acquire the appropriate amount of training on account of credit 
constraints), since the presence of these constraints is more closely associated with 
low incomes than with unemployment.  
 
The Benefit Transfer Program (BTP) 
 
The aim of the Benefit Transfer Program is simply to redirect the funds that 
the government currently spends on the unemployed - in the form of unemployment 
benefits, temporary layoff pay, redundancy subsidies, poverty allowances, and more - 
so as to give firms an incentive to employ these people. The BTP gives the long-term 
unemployed people the opportunity to redirect some of the benefits to which he is 
entitled to a voucher that can be turned over to a firm that will hire him. 
The magnitude of the vouchers is to be set by the government, and depends on 
the magnitude of individuals’ unemployment benefits (the higher the benefits, the 
higher the vouchers) and unemployment duration (the longer the unemployment 
spells, the higher the vouchers). The size of the vouchers is set so as to be financed 
from the unemployment benefits and other welfare entitlements foregone when people 
move from unemployment into jobs. Once a person is hired, the voucher gradually 
declines as the duration of employment proceeds. The vouchers could be given either 
to the prospective employers or employees. When unemployed people find jobs, they 
give up their unemployment benefits in exchange for the wage they earn.  
The vouchers come in two varieties: “recruitment vouchers” and “training 
vouchers.” The former are granted solely on the condition that a previously long-term 
unemployed person is recruited; the latter are conditional on the employer being able 
to proves that the voucher is spent entirely on training the new recruit at nationally  
 
20 
accreditted training schemes. The recruitment and training vouchers both are related 
in the same way to the duration of a person’s previous unemployment and the 
duration of that person’s subsequent employment, but the level of the training voucher 
(other things equal) is higher than that of the recruitment voucher. 
Since the BTP is voluntary, it extends the range of choices open to the 
unemployed and their potential employers. The unemployed will join only if it is to 
their advantage, i.e. if the wages they would be offered are higher than their 
unemployment benefits. At the same time, employers will join only if they find it 
profitable. Once again, many could well do so, since the vouchers could reduce their 
labour costs. In short, employees may wind up receiving substantially more than their 
unemploymen t support, and many employers may find themselves paying 
substantially less than the prevailing wages.  The BTP has the unique capability of 
making most participants in the labor market better off: the unemployed who earns 
more, the employer who secures a lower cost, and the government that reduces its 
expenses incurred for the unemployed. This “free lunch” is possible since the BTP 
induces people who were previously unemployed to become productive, and the 
proceeds of the output they generate may be divided among the economic agents 
above.  
The BTP has been implemented in various forms in the UK, the Netherlands, 
and several other OECD countries. Empirical studies of the program indicate that 
there are three major obstacles to its effectiveness: (i) displacement of current 
employees by the targeted groups of workers, (ii) dead-weight (paying vouchers to 
unemployed people who would have found jobs anyway), and (iii) substitution (the 
employment of the targeted group rather than unemployed workers outside the 
targeted group). The first obstacle can by confining the vouchers to firms that increase 
their total employment relative to their industry average. (The condition must be 
formulated relative to the industry average, for otherwise the scheme would be less 
effective in economic downturns – when the need for employment creation is greatest 
– than in upturns.) The second and third obstacles can be reduced by targeting the 
employment vouchers at the long-term unemployed (since they have a relatively low 
probability of finding jobs anyway and are often imperfect substitutes for the short-
term unemployed). However, these measures can only reduce, but never completely 
eliminate displacement, dead-weight and substitution. Nevertheless, evaluations of the 
program in t he UK and the Netherlands have shown that, when the program is 
appropriately designed, it is able to create significant additional employment without 
putting upward pressure on wages. Moreover, even if the vouchers lead some firms to 
substitute their current employees for subsidized workers to be retain the subsidized 
workers only so long as their vouchers last, the program will still succeed in 
substituting short-term for long-term unemployment. This would still lead to a fall in 
aggregate unemployment, since the short-term unemployed have higher chances of 
employment than the long-term unemployed. 
Beyond that, the BTP is not be inflationary, since it reduces firms' labour costs 
and since the long-term unemployed have no noticeable effect on wage inflation. If 
designed properly, it costs the government nothing, since the money for the 
employment vouchers would have been spent on unemployment support anyway.  
By offering higher vouchers for training, the Program could become the basis 
for an effective national training initiative. Clearly, firms will spend the vouchers on 
training only if they intend to retain their recruits after the subsidies have run out. 
Thus the training for the unemployed would automatically come with the prospect of 
long-term employment. This is something that the existing government training  
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schemes do not offer. Many existing schemes also run the risk of being ill-suited to 
people's diverse potential job opportunities, whereas under the BTP firms would 
naturally provide the training most appropriate to the available jobs. And whereas the 
existing training schemes are costly to run, the BTP is free.  
Finally, the BTP could play a vital role in tackling regional unemployment 
problems.  Regions of high unemployment would become areas containing a high 
proportion of workers with training vouchers, thereby providing an incentive for 
companies to move there and provide the appropriate training.  
 
 
Unemployment and Training Accounts (UTAs) 
 
Under this proposal  - already implemented partially in Chile  - every 
employable person would have an unemployment account to provide support against 
job loss and a training account to provide funding to acquire new skills. Instead of 
paying taxes to finance unemployment support, further education and training, 
employed people would be required to make regular contributions to their UTAs. The 
mandatory contributions would rise with their incomes. To maintain the living 
standards of the poor, the government would pay contributions of the lowest income 
groups, and tax the contributions of the higher income groups. People could also 
make voluntary contributions in excess of these amounts. 
If people become unemployed, they could make limited withdrawals from 
their unemployment accounts instead of receiving unemployment benefits. If they 
wished to acquire skills, they could draw on their training accounts instead of 
receiving government grants, subsidies, and loans. If their UTA balances fell below a 
specified limit, they would receive public assistance on the same basis as with the 
conditional negative income tax scheme above. If their UTA balances became 
sufficiently high, they could use the surplus funds for other purposes. At the end of 
their working lives, their remaining UTA balances could be used to top up their 
pensions. 
People would be able to borrow money on favourable terms for their training 
accounts, enabling them to finance their training through their future incomes. 
Unemployed people who develop promising job market strategies at their Restart 
interviews could receive government loan guarantees when they borrowed training 
account money. Employers' contributions to training accounts would receive 
favourable tax treatment. 
People would be free to make withdrawals from their training accounts at any 
point in their working lifetimes. Those who identify their preferred careers early in 
their working lives may draw substantially on their accounts soon after leaving 
secondary school. Those who take longer to find their niche in the labour market, or 
those who require retraining upon changing occupations, would make significant 
withdrawals much later in their careers. In this way, the training accounts would 
enable people to remain employable and adaptable throughout their working lives. 
The UTAs would initially be managed largely on a Pay-As-You-Go basis 
(similar to saving accounts, from which people can make withdrawals even though 
the banks use most of the money for other purposes). With the passage of time, the 
UTAs would eventually be turned into a fully funded system, where individuals  
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would have discretion over who could manage their UTAs. To guard against 
bankruptcy, the financial activities of the private-sector UTA fund managers would be 
regulated, along lines similar to the regulation of commercial banks. 
Adopting the UTA system could substantially reduce the level of long-term 
unemployment and promote skills. In particular, moving from unemployment benefits 
to unemployment accounts would give people greater incentives to avoid long periods 
of unemployment. For the longer people remain unemployed, the lower will be their 
unemployment account balances and consequently the smaller the funds available to 
them later on. And since the unemployment accounts generate more employment than 
unemployment benefits, the  unemployment account contributions necessary to 
finance a given level of unemployment support would be lower than the taxes 
necessary to finance the same level of unemployment benefits.  
Furthermore, the training accounts would be better suited than the cu rrent 
education and training programs to ensure people's lifetime employability, since the 
accounts could be accessed whenever employees and their employers found it 
maximally worthwhile. In this way, employers and employees stand to gain from the 
switch to UTAs. Retired people would gain through their ability to use their UTA 
balances to augment their pensions. And the government would gain, since the 
removal of the distortions from unemployment benefit system would promote new 
economic activity and thereby generate increased tax revenue. Beyond that, the UTAs 
would be more efficient than the current system at redistributing income from rich to 
poor, since unemployment benefits and training schemes are not targeted exclusively 
at the poor, whereas government contributions to UTAs would be.  
In order to provide additional incentives to find work and acquire the relevant 
skills, the government would provide subsidies for long-term unemployed people who 
use their UTAs to provide recruitment vouchers or training vouchers for firms that 
hire them. The size of each person's voucher would depend on his wages earned over 
next two years of subsequent employment. The recruitment vouchers would reduce 
firms' cost of employing the long-term unemployed; the training vouchers would 
reduce the cost of training them. The subsidies would be set so that they could be 
financed through the tax revenues from people's first two years of subsequent 
employment and through the abolition of in-work benefits. I d on’t know what the 
underscored words mean.  
In short, replacing the current system by UTA would reduce unemployment 
and simultaneously promote equality. While people are generally resentful of their tax 
burden and often demeaned by the existing unemployment benefits and training 
programs, they would be more willing to contribute to personalised accounts for their 
own purposes. The UTAs would give people more freedom to use unemployment 
support and training funds to meet their diverse individual needs. It would give them 
greater la titude to respond to changing job opportunities, finance periods of job 
search, acquire skills, and provide for retirement. And all this could be done without 
creating greater inequality or increasing government expenditure.  
Auctioning Off Unemployment Benefits and Employment Vouchers 
Existing unemployment benefit systems could be radically reformed to 
improve the incentives for job creation and job search without exacerbating disparities 
in incomes. Auctioning employment vouchers and auctioning unemployment benefits 
may be useful in this regard.  
Regarding the former proposal, the government could auction employment 
vouchers to the firms. Firms would qualify for a number of vouchers equal to (a) the  
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number of previously unemployed people they intend to hire minus (b) the number of 
employees they fire (or separate from).1 Firms’ entitlement would also be withdrawn 
if they used the vouchers to displace current employees. To make this provision 
credible, employees who believe they have been displaced would have the right of 
complaint, to be investigated by an independent body. If the complaint is found to 
have been justified, the firm in question would be fined. (This anti-displacement 
provision has been successfully tried in Australia). To prevent the short-term 
unemployed driving the long-term unemployed out of the market, there would be 
separate options for workers belonging to broad groups with different unemployment 
durations. Another possibility is for the government to auction employment vouchers 
to unemployed people.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In sum, we believe that the EU unemployment problem needs to be attacked 
on two fronts: through a broad spectrum of supply-side policies and the demand 
management policy. The expansion of aggregate demand is necessary to increase both 
investment and employment. However, unless supply side measures are also taken, 
demand expansion can result in more inflation instead of more employment, because 
of the mismatch between the demand and supply of labour. What is important to 
stress is that both demand and supply side policies must be adopted together by all 
European countries, in order both to avoid beggar-my-neighbour problems, and, at the 
same time, to catch all the possible complementary effects of these policies.  
                                                   
1 This difference may be adjusted for average changes in employment within that 
sector. Specifically, if sectoral employment is shrinking (expanding), then firms 
receive a number of vouchers greater (less) than the difference between the number of 
unemployed people hired  and the number of employees fired. The reason for this 
adjustment is to avoid the possibility that the effectiveness of the voucher policy may 
diminish as the sector falls into a recession.  